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KenyaIn this paper I argue that there has been a critical shift towards war by conservation in which conserva-
tion, security and counter insurgency (COIN) are becoming more closely integrated. In this new phase
concerns about global security constitute important underlying drivers, while biodiversity conservation
is of secondary importance. This is a significant break from earlier phases of fortress conservation and war
for biodiversity. In order to develop a better understanding of these shifts, this paper analyzes the exist-
ing conceptual approaches, notably environmental security which seeks to understand how resources
cause or shape conflict, and political ecology approaches that focus on the struggles over access to and
control over resources. However, this paper indicates the limitations of these existing debates for
understanding recent shifts, which require a fresh approach. I chart the rise of the narrative I call
poachers-as-terrorists, which relies on the invocation of the idea that ivory is the white gold of Jihad, a
phrase which is closely associated with an Elephant Action League (EAL) report in 2012 which claimed
Al Shabaab used ivory to fund its operations. This narrative is being extended and deepened by a pow-
erful alliance of states, conservation NGOs, Private Military Companies and international organizations,
such that it is shaping policies, especially in areas of US geo-strategic interest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
As a result conservation is becoming a core element of a global security project, with significant
implications for conceptual debates and for conservation practice on the ground.
 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
This paper explores a new phase of conservation which combi-
nes biodiversity losses with concerns about with global security,
such that there has been a shift to what I characterize as war by
conservation, in both discursive and material terms. Political ecolo-
gists have already produced an interesting and substantial analysis
of the relationships between conservation, violence and conflict
(see for example Peluso, 1993; Peluso and Watts, 2001; Peluso
and Vandergeest, 2011; Lunstrum, 2014; Neumann, 2004;
Fairhead, 2001; Ybarra, 2012; Pearson, 2012). However, current
shifts in conservation mean these important debates need a
thorough a re-examination. This is not just a ‘back to the barriers’
or fortress conservation movement, which implies a retreat behind
the fences of heavily defended protected areas. This is an ‘offensive
position’ in certain locations whereby conservation is the
intervening aggressor, not simply the defender of wildlife; war
by conservation is a proactive, interventionist militarized response
that is spatially amorphous and extends well beyond protected
areas and into the land and communities surrounding them. While
political ecologists have highlighted the ways that conservationstrategies can be violent, this new phase of war by conservation
differs because it combines anxieties about global security,
with environmental concerns and counter-insurgency (COIN)
techniques. One of its main driving objectives is security and stabi-
lization of areas that are of geostrategic interest to the US-led War
on Terror. Furthermore, this new phase can be characterized as war
by conservation because conservation agencies themselves are
becoming are engaged in use of force against people they identify
as poachers and as members of terrorist networks.
There is an increasing tendency to discursively frame poaching
via reference to terrorism; this has been extended and embedded
via invocation of the idea that ivory is the white gold of jihad, a
phrasewhich is closely associatedwith a 2012 report fromElephant
Action League (EAL) (Kalron and Crosta, 2012; White, 2014). The
narrative of what I call poachers-as-terrorists renders the complex-
ity of poaching invisible; further it has the effect of displacing alter-
native, longer standing approaches to poaching which seek to
understand the very different reasons why different people engage
in illegal hunting in a range of locations. It also distracts attention
from thewell documentedways that states, political patronage net-
works, standing armies and private companies engage in or collude
with poaching (see Duffy and Humphreys, 2014; Ellis, 1994; Reeve
and Ellis, 1995). The narrative of poachers-as-terrorists resonates
withwider conceptual approaches of environmental securitywhich
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natural resources to fund and support their operations (for example
see Le Billon, 2008; Berdal and Malone, 2000).
However, in this paper I argue that framings of poachers-
as-terrorists and casting ivory as white gold of jihad are simplistic
and poorly evidenced; yet, they have gained traction because they
intersect with pre-existing concerns about global security, specifi-
cally anxieties about the expansion of ‘terrorist networks’ post
9/11. Further, this discursive production of poachers-as-terrorists
has material effects, especially in areas that are of geo-strategic
interest for the US-led War on Terror. The material outcome is that
it has become more possible to consider greater use of force,
including COIN, for any perceived or actual threat to certain iconic
species (notably elephants). As such, war by conservation also rep-
resents a conceptual shift in current thinking in political ecology
and environmental security about the links between natural
resources and conflict. While this paper focuses specifically on
the debates around the potential link between ivory poaching
and Al Shabaab in East Africa, the rapidly shifting dynamics in
the conservation sector have parallels elsewhere (see Ybarra, this
issue; Lombard, this issue).
These shifts deserve greater critical analysis. First, I examine the
relevant debates from environmental security and political
ecology; second, I sketch out the recent redefinition of poachers
as terrorists; and finally I offer an analysis of how this is shifting
practice towards war by conservation. The purpose is to explore
the theoretical and evidential bases of the ways narratives around
poaching are being reconfigured to combine with, deepen and
extend global security concerns. This paper also demonstrates
how those narratives have material effects and are producing a
new phase of war by conservation.1 MIKE Database http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike/index.php. (accessed
13.09.14).2. Shifting from war for biodiversity to war by conservation
I argue that we are witnessing a shift to a new phase of war by
conservation, but first it is important to note that this builds on ear-
lier approaches to conservation, notably fortress conservation and
war for biodiversity. War by conservation represents a continuity
of some aspects of previous conservation practice, since there has
been a long and well documented history of the use of force against
people to protect wildlife and militarization of protected areas,
especially in sub-Saharan Africa (see Neumann, 2004; West et al.,
2006; Smith and Rotshuizen, 2013; Ellis, 1994; Reeve and Ellis,
1995). In order to understand how this current phase differs, it is
useful to provide a brief explanation of these earlier approaches.
There is already a substantial analysis of the significance of the
fortress approach to conservation (Brockington, 2002; Brockington
et al., 2008: 17–86; West et al., 2006; Peluso, 1993) and the ideas
and practices of war for biodiversity (Neumann, 2004; Duffy and
Humphreys, 2014; Peluso, 1993). Fortress conservation denotes a
model of protected areas, produced via removal, eviction or dis-
placement of local communities to provide separate territories
for wildlife; it is closely associated with the historical extension
of the model of national parks provided by Yellowstone National
Park in the USA (see Brockington, 2002; Brockington et al., 2008:
17–86; Adams, 2004). War for biodiversity denotes the sense that
wildlife is under threat and therefore conservation agencies need
to engage in more forceful approaches to protect wildlife, to such
that it was commonly referred to as a war to save them (Duffy
and Humphreys, 2014). This was accompanied by greater degrees
of militarization of protected areas, especially across Sub-Saharan
Africa (Smith and Rotshuizen, 2013; Reeve and Ellis, 1995). War
by conservation represents a break with this earlier phase because
it is characterized by a much fuller integration of conservation
objectives with global security concerns, specifically the US-ledPlease cite this article in press as: Duffy, R. War, by Conservation. Geoforum (War on Terror and COIN, such that conservation is relegated to a
position of secondary importance. Furthermore, conservation
agencies are increasingly engaged in using force to tackle those
identified as poachers and as members of terrorist networks. As
such conservation and security concerns are combining in new
ways.
This shift has been facilitated by a series of factors. One of these
is the rises in poaching wildlife, especially of elephants and rhinos
in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Duffy et al., 2015a,b). Data from the
Monitoring Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE)1 database indicates
that rates of illegal killing of elephants across Africa rose from
0.6–2.1% of the total population in 2005, to 3.5–11.7% in 2011
(CITES, 2012: 5; also see Wittemyer et al., 2014). An estimated
15,000 elephants were killed in 42 MIKE monitored sites in 2012
(Nellemann et al., 2014: 32). Rates of rhino poaching have also
increased substantially since 2008, with the majority of rhinos
poached in Zimbabwe and South Africa; in 2007 approximately 50
rhinos were poached in South Africa alone, yet in 2013 over 1000
were illegally killed (Nellemann et al., 2014: 37; also see Standley
and Emslie, 2013: 6; Milliken et al., 2009: 4; Ayling, 2013).
The drivers behind such rises in poaching and trafficking are
complex and wide ranging, but a key factor has been the rise in
wealth in existing consumer states (such as China in the case of
ivory) and a mix of rising wealth and shifting cultural norms in
new markets (as in the case of rhino horn consumption in Viet-
nam) (see TRAFFIC, 2008; Milliken and Shaw, 2012; Challender
and MacMillan, 2014; Duffy et al., 2015b). The figures do indicate
a genuine rise in poaching of rhinos and elephants, rather than
simply an increase in detection rates. The rises have led to calls
from Governments and conservation NGOs for a more aggressive
approach to anti-poaching by state conservation agencies, private
sector wildlife managers and conservation NGOs alike; this is espe-
cially the case in areas of Sub-Saharan Africa where concerns about
security (notably concerns about Al-Shabaab activity) coincide
with rises in organized forms of poaching. The development of this
dynamic has allowed conservation and security to combine in
ways that require a fresh examination of existing conceptual
approaches. The link between conservation and conflict is an
increasingly important area for global policy. For example, Achim
Steiner, UN Under-Secretary General and Executive Director of
UNEP recently stated in a joint UNEP and INTERPOL report that
‘even the security and safety of countries and communities is
affected. . . .wildlife and forest crime, including charcoal, provides
potentially significant threat finance to militias and terrorist
groups. Already recognized as a grave issue in DRC and Somalia
by the UN Security Council, the assessment reveals that the scale
and role of wildlife and forest crime in threat finance calls for much
wider policy attention.’ (opening statement in Nellemann et al.
(2014: 4))
Environmental security analysts investigate the link between
natural resources and violent conflict. The approach is closely iden-
tified with the works of the Toronto Group and Thomas Homer-
Dixon (Homer-Dixon, 1999, 1994, 1991). Homer-Dixon (1994)
argues decreasing supplies of controllable resources, such as clean
water and good agricultural land will provoke interstate ‘simple
scarcity’ conflicts or resource wars; that large population move-
ments caused by environmental stress will induce group identity
conflicts and especially ethnic clashes; and that severe environ-
mental scarcity will increase economic deprivation and disrupt
key social institutions which would cause deprivation conflicts
such as civil strife and insurgency (also see Homer-Dixon, 1991,
1999; Theisen et al., 2013; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005).2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.09.014
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have been criticized by Gleditsch and others for their reliance on
largeN-study databases, lack of engagementwith specific case stud-
ies and over reliance on country-year and inter-state conflict data
(Gleditsch, 2012, 1998; Buhaug, 2010; Butler and Gates, 2012;
Peluso andWatts, 2001). It is important to note that environmental
security encompasses a much wider range of arguments than those
posed byHomer-Dixon and include notions of a conflict trap (Collier
et al., 2003; Bannon and Collier, 2003; Collier et al., 2008; Kaplan,
1994). They draw on a longer tradition of Malthusian understand-
ings of environment–society interactions, which views violence as
an outcome of natural resource scarcity, thereby acting as a ‘natural
check’ on population growth. Ideas of the environment as a source of
conflict, or as a security threat also resonated with the redefinition
of conflict in the post-Cold War era as ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor, 2012;
Berdal, 2003); the emergence of non-traditional security threats
such as global environmental change (Selby, 2014); as well as argu-
ments that greed and grievanceweremotivators for conflict (Berdal
and Malone, 2000; Nellemann et al., 2014: 48–49).
Environmental security has been criticized for the ways it links
environmental change and violent conflict, not least by political
ecologists (Selby, 2014; Selby and Hoffman, 2014; Hartmann,
2014; Fairhead et al., 2012; Benjaminsen et al., 2012). The environ-
mental security debate does not adequately explain war by conser-
vation either. It can be useful for thinking through how resources
and conflict might be linked for example, how wildlife products
might be used to fund militias. However, in this paper I question
exactly these sorts of claims and offer an explanation for why
and how such arguments can rise to international prominence
under certain circumstances. First though, it is useful to investigate
the points raised by political ecologists who have provided impor-
tant examinations of the linkages between violence and conserva-
tion. As stated earlier, Neumann notes that war is a commonmodel
for biodiversity protection in Africa, where protected areas become
spaces of violence in which human rights abuses and use of deadly
violence against humans in defence of wildlife have become nor-
malized (Neumann, 2004: 813; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011;
White, 2014; Bocarejo and Ojeda, this issue). For Neumann this is
explained via a deep seated fear of the poor and their claims on
resources, tapping into the Malthusian interpretations of environ-
mental security which encourage conservation agencies to view
poor people as combatants (Neumann, 2004: 816–822).
Le Billon (2012) questions the idea of resource wars and seeks
to understand the links between resources and conflict. He focuses
on oil, gems and timber and argues resources make wars more
likely, and that they have an influence on the severity and duration
of conflict. Le Billon’s contention is that economic dependence on
some resources can increase vulnerability to armed conflict, that
the social relations of production around resources matter, and
that opportunity to extract or the ‘lootability’ of the resource is also
important (also see Le Billon, 2001, 2005; Dressler and Guieb,
2015). Furthermore it is important to note the ways that resources
can be used by states to extend and maintain control. In their
review of the political ecologies of war and forests, Peluso and
Vandergeest strongly argue that from the 1950s to the 1970s nat-
ures were remade in relation to nation-states, particularly via
counter insurgency operations; the purpose of the drawing in for-
ests as sites of counter-insurgency activity and nation-building
was to extend and deepen state power at a time when the reach
of centrally focused states was limited (Peluso and Vandergeest,
2011: 587; also see Dunn, 2009). Such initiatives can also neatly
intersect with state objectives to quell, control or displace ‘unruly’
populations, or groups operating across international borders via
counter insurgency operations, in which biodiversity conservation
can play a central and legitimating role, thus deepening and
extending state power (Ybarra, 2012: 497–498; also see Peluso,Please cite this article in press as: Duffy, R. War, by Conservation. Geoforum (1993; Neumann, 1998; Le Billon, 2001, 2008; Bocarejo and Ojeda,
this issue). Appeals to protect and save natural or national heritage
are frequently overlain with the argument that states have a moral
obligation to protect key wildlife populations, and such appeals
can be traced to the colonial period (especially in the British
Empire, see MacKenzie, 1988). This current phase differs – it relies
on the idea that securing natural heritage will simultaneously
achieve national security objectives, and more critically, address
global security concerns, notably the US-led War on Terror. In
arguments about war by conservation, that nature (wildlife) is
remade to extend and deepen the powers of states engaged in
the War on Terror in areas where they currently have limited
reach. The debates from within political ecology are useful for
understanding how states use environmental initiatives to gain
greater levels of control over specific territories and populations.
However, it does not explain the mechanisms by which this is
made possible, and in this paper I cast light on how this shift can
occur.
I aim to develop a better understanding of how new approaches
differ from fortress conservation because war by conservation inte-
grates concerns about biodiversity losses with a global security
agenda and wider justifications of the use of COIN techniques.
The ways that a range of organizations present the links between
poaching, conflict and terrorism reflect and extend the arguments
from environmental security and political ecology, that lucrative
and lootable natural resources might fuel conflicts. However, I sug-
gest that this argument is not borne out by the evidence which is
presented to support the position that ivory poaching funds terror-
ism. What is interesting is that the argument is readily accepted
precisely because it matches and extends pre-existing concerns
about global security; further, the claims are deployed to provide
a rationale for a more interventionist approach and as a justifica-
tion for the extension of a range of surveillance and COIN tech-
niques more commonly associated with the War on Terror.
3. The discursive production of poachers-as-terrorists
In this section I chart the rise of a narrative that I have termed
poachers-as-terrorists. Here it is useful to examine in detail how
poachers are being redefined not just as a national or regional
security threats but as a critical global security threat, providing
a legitimating base for arguments in support of war by conserva-
tion. This is not to suggest that all forms of poaching in a diverse
range of locations is being discursively linked to terrorism, it is
not; here I argue that the linkage of poaching with terrorism and
organized crime is becoming one of the primary lenses through
which concerns about poaching and biodiversity losses are being
articulated by an alliance of powerful actors that encompasses
states, militaries, conservation NGOs and private military compa-
nies. The claims have been amplified and extended by various
news media. However, these debates do not reflect the complex
range of different kinds of poachers, including key differences
between commercial and subsistence poachers (for more discus-
sion see Duffy and Humphreys (2014) and Duffy et al. (2015a)).
Nor do they reflect the historical production of poaching as a crime
by the criminalization of African hunting methods by successive
colonial administrations (MacKenzie, 1988; Neumann, 2004).
Finally, the invocation of global security threats via reference to
poachers-as-terrorists also distracts from and obscures the well
documented involvement of states and armies in large scale poach-
ing for ivory and rhino horn; one of the best documented cases is
the involvement of the South African Defence Force in poaching
in Southern Africa in the 1980s, which traded in ivory, rhino horn,
hardwoods and drugs to fund its campaigns in South West Africa
(now Namibia), Angola and Mozambique (Reeve and Ellis, 1995;
Ellis, 1994; Kumleben, 1996; Wyatt, 2013).2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.09.014
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between poaching, wildlife trafficking and regional or global secu-
rity. Such concerns resonate with debates from environmental
security (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Gleditsch, 2012, 1998; Buhaug,
2010; Butler and Gates, 2012; Collier et al., 2003; Bannon and
Collier, 2003). For example, the International Consortium for Com-
batting Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) was established in 2010 in recog-
nition of the need to tackle the growing influence on
transnational organized crime in trafficking of endangered species.
It was an initiative of Interpol, CITES, the World Bank, The World
Customs Union and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the pur-
pose was to provide co-ordinated support to national wildlife law
enforcement agencies, as well as regional networks; so for example
ICCWC provided specialized training for national agencies in
2013.2 Major donors are also taking this issue seriously and funding
has been made available for anti-poaching and anti-trafficking initia-
tives in areas of geo-strategic interest (see Lawson and Vines, 2014).
Furthermore, linking poaching to global terrorism has shaped argu-
ments about appropriate responses. The coding of poachers-as-
terrorists creates the context in which conservation NGOs, states
and the private sector can call for more forceful approaches. Indeed
this theme was evident at the conference ‘International Wildlife
Trafficking: Solutions to a Global Crisis’ held by United for Wildlife
at Zoological Society of London (ZSL) in February 2013 in advance
of the high level London Conference on combatting trafficking (also
February 2013); Will Travers of Born Free Foundation publicly stated
that conservation NGOs needed to talk the language of global pov-
erty and global security to remain relevant.3 This is indicative of
the ways that NGOs increasingly operate in a context in which they
must compete for public attention and sources of funding (for fur-
ther discussion see Cooley and Ron (2002)).
Below I set out the range of organizations that invoke global
security as a rationale for conservation, by drawing a link between
poaching and terrorism. I analyze public statements from key
actors from four groups involved in high profile debates about
the links between poaching and global security: conservation
NGOs, expert witness testimonial to the US Congress, national gov-
ernments and international organizations. Many more organiza-
tions are also promoting this particular argument, but for reasons
of space it is impossible to review them all, so here I focus on
the most influential ones in order to trace how the discursive pro-
duction of poachers-as-terrorists has developed.
In this paper I demonstrate how a poorly evidenced claim pro-
vided by an Elephant Action League (EAL) Report in 2012 has risen
to global prominence. It is rare that we are able to trace the incep-
tion, evolution and extension of a narrative, but it is possible in this
case. A key issue is not whether we can establish beyond any doubt
that ivory is used to fund Al Shabaab or that poaching contributes
to global instability; what is important is that a very wide range of
organizations are all telling a remarkably similar story in very sim-
ilar ways. Here I want to chart the rise of the ‘poacher-as-terrorist’
framing and the EAL reference to ivory as the white gold of jihad (I
have sketched out a broad timeline in Appendix A). The claim has
been taken up and extended for two reasons: first because it taps
into a pre-existing and deep-seated fear about the expansion of
terrorism networks post 9/11; and second because it might offer
the possibility of a new and lucrative stream of funding for conser-
vation NGOs.2 See http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/iccwc.php; http://www.interpol.int/Crime-ar-
eas/Environmental-crime/International-Consortium-on-Combating-Wildlife-Crime;
also see Sellar, 2014.
3 United for Wildlife Symposium on international wildlife trafficking, 11–12
February 2014, a full recording is available at http://www.zsl.org/science/previous-
scientific-events/symposium-international-wildlife-trafficking (accessed 15.08.14);
the author was also present at the conference.
Please cite this article in press as: Duffy, R. War, by Conservation. Geoforum (First, it is useful to analyze the evidence base for claims that
ivory poaching is linked to terrorism. The EAL report was based
on undercover research in Somalia where EAL researchers were
able to interview one individual who claimed that there were some
traders on the coast who occasionally traded ivory and the ivory
sometimes came from Al Shabaab operatives. The video and audio
evidence remain confidential due to fears about reprisals against
informants. However, the evidence was shown in confidence to a
number of security agencies around the world.4 The report on the
investigation was placed on the EAL website in 2012 but was only
reported by the international media after the attacks on Nairobi’s
Westgate Mall 21–24 September 2013. Since then, the argument
that Al Shabaab uses ivory to finance its operations has proliferated.
It is possible that the reliance on a single EAL report partly accounts
for the remarkable similarity of the statements on ivory, terrorism
and Al Shabaab. The claim has been repeated by several organiza-
tions with either no reference to any supporting evidence or via ref-
erence to very limited supporting documentation; however, the
claims have been repeated in several published papers by think
tanks, academics and international organizations. In turn those pub-
lished documents are increasingly cited as supporting evidence, even
though they only repeat the original poorly evidenced statements;
these include media reports in national newspapers such as the
UK’s Independent,5 and a recent report by the UK’s Chatham House
(Lawson and Vines, 2014). They all cite the same EAL investigation
and news media reports as the core, or only, supporting evidence.
Yet, a recent report from UNEP and INTERPOL on environmental
crime questions the accuracy of the links between ivory and Al Sha-
baab. The report points out that ivory may be a major source of
income for militia groups (especially Janjaweed) in DRC and Central
African Republic; however, it notes that claims Al Shabaab was traf-
ficking 30.6 tonnes of ivory per annum (representing 3600 elephants
per year) through southern Somalia are ‘highly unreliable’ and that
the main sources of income for Al Shabaab remain charcoal trading
and ex-pat finance (Nellemann et al., 2014: 78–81; also see Men-
khaus cited in Williams, 2014: 909; Mcguire/RUSI, 2015).
It can be argued that the current concerns around the links
between ivory poaching and Al Shabaab reflect a more established
and historical fear of Somalia as a source of instability and criminal
activity in the region. During the 1980s the KWS blamed Somali
shifta (bandits) for crossing the border to wipe out the elephant
population (Leakey, 2001: 102). Furthermore, Williams (2014)
argues that following major offensives in Somalia, Al Shabaab is
becoming a less powerful and significant force which means that
the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM) have turned their attention towards
stabilization rather than concentrating on offensives against the
group.
Nevertheless, claims that there is a link between ivory and
terrorism are becoming central to the legitimating arguments of
policy networks, especially in US and UK Government circles. For
example, in 2012 the US Senate and US House of Representatives
held a special congressional hearing on the ‘The Global Poaching
Crisis’. Reviewing the evidence reveals that concerns were raised
in 2012 that wildlife products might be used to fund terrorism. It
concluded that ‘Evidence is mounting that Al-Shabaab, an
al-Qaeda affiliate, and the Lord’s Resistance Army are using these
illegal animal products to fund their brutal campaigns of violence4 Personal communication from conservation professional via email to author
(25.02.14); http://elephantleague.org/project/africas-white-gold-of-jihad-al-sha-
baab-and-conflict-ivory/.
5 The Independent, 04.02.14, Elephant Campaign: How Africa’s ‘white gold’ funds the
al-Shabaab militants http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/campaigns/elephant-cam-
paign/elephant-campaign-how-africas-white-gold-funds-the-alshabaab-militants-
9102862.html (accessed 25.06.14).
2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.09.014
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tial US International Conservation Caucus Foundation, David Barron,
stated that
‘Unless the United States takes strong action to combat the ille-
gal poaching and trade of wildlife, terrorist groups will be
increasingly fortified with funding and safe havens in Africa
from which to launch attacks against the United States and
our global interests.’7
The link was reiterated at a meeting of the International Conser-
vation Caucus Foundation (ICCF).8 At the ICCF meeting expert wit-
nesses carefully stated that ivory may fund Al Shabaab operations
or that ivory is an ideal commodity for groups like Al Shabaab (as well
as LRA and Janjaweed).9 However ICCF does not offer any supporting
evidence, save the statements of expert witnesses and links to a
2012 article in National Geographic entitled ‘Blood Ivory, Ivory
Worship’10 and a 2012 New York Times article by Jeffrey Gettleman11
entitled ‘Elephants Dying in an Epic Frenzy as Ivory Fuels Wars and
Profits’.12 In January 2015 two US Senators (Graham and Feinstein)
from ICCF introduced a bill to introduce a Wildlife Trafficking Act
in the US which would impose harsher penalties on traffickers; what
was significant, for the purposes of this paper, was that the rationale
provided was that ‘Illegal wildlife trafficking ranks among the top
five global crimes, generating an estimated US$8 billion to US$10 bil-
lion in illicit funds annually. There is also increasing evidence that
illegal wildlife trafficking is funding armed insurgencies including
Al Shabaab, the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Janjaweed, which
threaten the stability and security of many countries in Africa.13 This
characterization of Al Shabaab fits within the wider conceptual
debates of environmental security that aim to establish a link
between natural resources as a financial underpin for conflicts
(Berdal and Malone, 2000; Le Billon, 2008, 2012; UN, 2013). How-
ever, in this paper I contest that characterization and instead argue
that the discursive link between poaching and terrorism is used to
further the interests of the US-led War on Terror and has meant that
conservation has been integrated into much wider sets of policy
debates and initiatives linked to global security. Indeed, as Eckert
and Biersteker (2010) note in their analysis of the use of statistics
in policy debates around financing terrorism, under and over count-
ing by NGOs, international institutions and Governments, are a com-
mon problem because the debates are driven by particular political
imperatives to garner support for specific policy agendas (also see
Andreas and Greenhill, 2010).
In order to understand how a poorly evidenced claim has risen
to prominence, it is important to delve into the statements made
by expert witnesses, all of whom are well known individuals in6 http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=447&
Itemid=369 (accessed 29.04.13).
7 http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=447&
Itemid=369 (accessed 29.04.13).
8 ICCF was established in 2006 to support the work of the International Conser-
vation Caucus, the second largest caucus in the US Congress. For more information on
the work on ICCF see Corson (2010) and http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?op-
tion=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=63 (accessed 01.09.14).
9 Transcript of expert witness evidence provided at a hearing of ICCF http://
iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=447&Itemid=369
(accessed 13.08.14); and http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=445&Itemid=367 (accessed 13.08.14).
10 Christy, Brian (2012) ‘Blood Ivory, Ivory Worship’, National Geographic http://
ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2012/10/ivory/christy-text (accessed 15.08.14).
11 Gettleman, Jeffrey (2012) ‘ Elephants Dying in an Epic Frenzy as Ivory Fuels Wars
and Profits’ New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/africa/afric-
as-elephants-are-being-slaughtered-in-poaching-frenzy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
12 http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=445&
Itemid=367 (accessed 13.08.14).
13 Senators Graham and Feinstein Introduce Bill to Crack Down on Illegal Wildlife
Trafficking, http://iccfoundation.us/what-we-do/conservation_updates/jan-9-2015.
html (accessed 10.02.15).
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witnesses are drawn from the same conservation NGOs that are
actively promoting the message that increased poaching and the
illegal wildlife trade constitute a significant threat to global stabil-
ity and, more specifically US national interests. As experts, their
opinions can have a significant impact in shaping how we under-
stand poaching and its relevance to wider social, political and eco-
nomic concerns, or in this case to global security concerns (White,
2014; also see debates on the importance of epistemic communi-
ties, notably Haas (1992) and Davis Cross (2012)). It is via such
platforms that particular understandings of poaching, and the
potential threats it might pose, become widely accepted.
The 2012 hearing on ‘The Global Poaching Crisis’ heard expert
witness testimonials from Ian J. Saunders of the Tsavo Trust, who
claimed that rangers were now engaged in low level counter insur-
gency against rebel groups. He stated that there was a ‘credible,
increasing security threat from Al Shabaab in East Africa and that
this will be fueled from the wider illegal trade in ivory.’14 This
statement also makes it clear that international action is required
to save important species that are unable to defend themselves
against an aggressor, in this case the poacher-as-terrorist, presented
as a legitimate target for war by conservation. Further expert witness
testimonial was provided by Michael Fay, Senior Conservationist for
Wildlife Conservation Society (which runs the 96 Elephants
Campaign) who made similar supporting statements, and made
the case that conservation projects in certain African States ‘put
out brush fires of illegal activity that degrade security in these
nations, hurting US interests.’15
The ‘branding’ of ivory as the white gold of jihad has also been
promoted by high profile commentators writing in widely read
and well respected news media. For example, Monica Medina, a
former special assistant the Secretary for Defense in the US Depart-
ment of Defense wrote an Op Ed piece for the New York Times
(30.09.14) entitled ‘White Gold of Jihad’ (see White, 2014); in the
article she also refers to a panel in November 2012 sponsored by
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and National Geographic
on what the military could do to help, in the run up to Hillary
Clinton’s announcement of a major State Department initiative to
combat illegal wildlife trafficking.16 Well known film directors have
also combined with conservation NGOs to spread the message that
ivory funds terrorism; in December 2014, film director Kathryn
Bigelow released a short animated film, The Last Days of Ivory in con-
junction with WildAid, which directly links buying ivory in China to
funding conflict and terrorism in the Horn of Africa17; the film’s cam-
paign slogan is ‘End Ivory Funded Terrorism’ and is intended to be a
fundraising vehicle aimed at English speaking audiences.
The influence of the hearings, expert witness testimonials and
NGO campaigns are clearly discernible in recent policy commit-
ments by the US Government. For example, in July 2013, President
Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13648 on Combating Wild-
life Trafficking. The Executive Order stated ‘Wildlife trafficking
reduces those benefits while generating billions of dollars in illicit
revenues each year, contributing to the illegal economy, fueling
instability, and undermining security. . . . ., it is in the national
interest of the United States to combat wildlife trafficking’.1814 http://iccfoundation.us/downloads/Hearing_Testimony_Saunders.pdf (accessed
29.04.14), p. 6.
15 http://iccfoundation.us/downloads/Hearing_Testimony_Fay.pdf (accessed
29.04.14), p. 4.
16 Monica Medina, ‘White Gold of Jihad’, New York Times 30.09.14, http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/10/01/opinion/the-white-gold-of-jihad.html?_r=0 (accessed
13.08.14).
17 See http://www.lastdaysofivory.com/ (accessed 23.03.15).
18 White House (Obama Administration), ‘‘Combating Wildlife Trafficking,” Executive
Order 13648 of July 1, 2013, Federal Register 78(129), July 5, 2013, pp. 40621–40623.
Also see Wyler and Sheikh (2013: 2).
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22 Joshua Keating (2014) Ivory Funds Terrorism? http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_-
world_/2013/10/02/is_the_illegal_ivory_trade_funding_terrorist_groups_like_al_sha-
bab.html (accessed 13.08.14).
23 Wildlife Conservation Society 96 Elephants campaign, available at http://96ele-
phants.org/ (accessed 25.03.14). Also see http://www.wcs.org/press/press-releases/
96-elephants.aspx (accessed 14.08.14).
24 Wildlife Conservation Society 96 Elephants Campaign, http://www.96elephants.
org/chapter-2 (accessed 13.08.14).
25 http://www.awf.org/news/conservation-partners-announce-80m-clinton-global-
initiative-commitment-action-partnership-save.
26 ‘Clinton Global Initiative Commitment to Action: Partnership to Save Africa’s
Elephants’, http://www.wcs.org/press/press-releases/african-elephants-get-major-
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from several angles. These framings are powerful and have a far
reaching effect as they deepen and extend the dynamics of the
War on Terror precisely because they intersect so well with the
pre-existing agendas of major powers in the global system. Fur-
ther, it demonstrates how poachers are defined in ways that pro-
vide the foundation for calls for a more forceful approach to
conservation that can deliver a win–win of primarily contributing
to global security, and saving species as a secondary positive
outcome.
These themes are reflected in public statements made by one of
the world’s largest and most prominent conservation NGOs, Con-
servation International; for example, it recently stated that the
organization sees a link between the illegal ivory trade and global
terrorism:
‘Money from wildlife poaching and trafficking is directly linked
to the funding of dangerous rebel organizations and terrorist
networks. These include the Janjaweed militia in Darfur, the
Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and Al Shabaab in Somalia
— which is now linked to al Qaeda’.19
Conservation International promotes the idea that engaging in
conservation activity can contribute to US national interests, espe-
cially related to economy and security because competition over
scarce resources leads to conflict, instability and failed states.20
This reflects, and repeats the conceptual framing of key aspects of
the environmental security approach – that there is a link between
resource scarcity, conflict and instability. We can go one step further
and argue that it also contributes to the discursive production of
poachers-as-terrorists, rendering them legitimate targets of a war
by conservation, since they pose a clear and present threat to global
stability and forceful action against them is deemed as justifiable.
Conservation International has produced a short film, entitled ‘Direct
Connection’ using Harrison Ford (actor), Wes Busch of Northrop
Grumman (Director of a global security company) and Rob Walden,
Chairman of Walmart Stores (global corporation best known for its
department stores), to underline the link between conservation
and US national security and economic security. This is an interest-
ing integration of security concerns with a more established neolib-
eral approach to conservation: the increasing use of celebrities and
link up with corporate sponsors is now overlain with a new narrative
of urgency around the links between biodiversity losses and global
security (see Brockington, 2009; Büscher et al., 2012; Massé and
Lunstrum, 2015). Peter Seligmann, CEO and Chairman of Conserva-
tion International, recently linked poverty, trafficking and threats
to global stability as well. Commenting on the new Clinton Global
Initiative support to end wildlife trafficking he stated:
‘What we’re seeing here is the perfect storm of extinction, pov-
erty and radicalism. We’re seeing the deterioration of societies
and a massive threat to the stability of not only African nations
but the entire world. A crucial step in changing this equation is
to ensure that the ivory trade comes to an end’.21
However, the supporting evidence cited by Conservation Inter-
national is rather narrow; it could be argued that the evidence base
for links between poaching and terrorism is held by organizations
such as Interpol or the CIA, and is therefore confidential, but this is19 ‘Global Stability’ http://www.conservation.org/what/pages/global-stability.aspx
(accessed 14.08.14).
20 ‘Promoting Economic, National and Global Security’ http://www.conservation.
org/projects/Pages/Promoting-Economic-National-and-Global-Security-Direct-con-
nection.aspx (accessed 14.08.14).
21 Peter Seligmann, ‘One Way to Fight Terrorism: End the Ivory Trade’ http://
blog.conservation.org/2013/10/one-way-to-fight-terrorism-end-the-ivory-trade/
(accessed 25.03.14).
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from Slate.com, which in turn referenced the EAL report that links
ivory poaching and Al Shabaab.22
Another leading NGO, Wildlife Conservation Society, has
launched its ‘96 Elephants’ campaign, which has three central pil-
lars ‘Humans and Elephants’, ‘Terror and Ivory’ and ‘Heroes and
Hope’ which links poverty, regional instability, poaching, terrorism
and the role of conservationists and rangers as heroes.23 Under the
topic of Terror and Ivory the campaign makes a series of statements
but does not provide any references to support the claims. It does
quote the public statements by Hillary Clinton and by Congressman
Ed Royce (co-chair of the International Conservation Caucus of the
US Congress). The 96 Elephants campaign refers to ivory as the
‘white gold of Jihad’24 which is a reference to the terminology of
the same EAL report cited by Conservation International.
Hillary Clinton and The Clinton Global Initiative have also pro-
vided support for increased responses to poaching and trafficking.
For example, in 2013 it announced a commitment to raise US
$80 million to combat trafficking and poaching as a security threat
in Africa.25 The funds will be used to tackle poaching and trafficking
via three initiatives under the headlines of ‘Stop the Killing, Stop the
Trafficking and Stop the Demand’ during 2013–2016. The partners,
or in their own terms, ‘Commitment Makers’ include Wildlife Con-
servation Society, African Wildlife Foundation, Conservation Interna-
tional, International Fund for Animal Welfare, and World Wildlife
Fund.26
The presentation of poachers-as-terrorists is epitomised by the
recent United for Wildlife (UFW)27 #whosesideareyouon campaign.
It encourages supporters to choose sides between wildlife and the
criminals who kill them for money and refers to ‘Blood Ivory’ as a
source of funding for the Lord’s Resistance Army.28 This is a clear
attempt to draw connections with the idea of blood diamonds and
the assumption that natural resources can be used to fuel conflict
and instability (even terrorism). Such a dichotomous presentation
eases the discursive (and material) production of poachers as legiti-
mate targets of a war by conservation – making their deaths not only
permissible but necessary to save threatened wildlife.
International organizations have also contributed to the discur-
sive production of poachers-as-terrorists and therefore added
weight to the idea that poaching and global insecurity are inter-
linked. John Scanlon, the Secretary-General of CITES has made
the link in public statements; in an interview with the Guardian
newspaper in 2013 he stated that ‘The UN Security Council
recently linked the Lord’s Resistance Army to ivory smuggling in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while al-Qaida’s
al-Shabaab group has been linked to illegal ivory in Somalia.’29boost.aspx (accessed 30.04.14).
27 UFW is an initiative by the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and Prince Harry via
the Royal Foundation. It brings together leading conservation organizations (ZSL,
WCS, CI, FFI, WWF, IUCN and TNC) to cooperate to facilitate responses to the apparent
rise in poaching and trafficking.
28 ‘Conflict’ http://www.unitedforwildlife.org/#!/the-facts/conflict (accessed
14.08.14).
29 Carrington, Daniel (2013) ‘People and Animals at Immediate Risk from Wildlife
Crime, CITES chief warns’ The Guardian (UK) http://www.theguardian.com/environ-
ment/2013/mar/01/people-animals-wildlife-crime (accessed 15.08.14).
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insecurity; he reported that poached ivory from Chad and Sudan
was believed to be exchanged against money, weapons and ammu-
nition to support conflicts in neighboring countries.30 Such high pro-
file statements have been endorsed in more thorough reports by
international organizations. A key example is the report by UNEP,
CITES, IUCN and TRAFFIC entitled Elephants in the Dust which states:
‘Political instability, armed militias, criminals, and most impor-
tantly, the rise in market demand, have once again resulted in a
rise in poaching. . . . Poaching operations range from the
old-fashioned camel- and horse-based marauders to active
intelligence units and helicopters, the use of which suggests
substantial demand’ (UNEP et al., 2013: 12).
The report draws on a much fuller range of unpublished, confi-
dential and published information – including data from MIKE,
ETIS and CITES, as well as a number of academic studies on poach-
ing rates. However, no source is provided for the statement quoted
above, but the statement in the UNEP report is likely to be quoted
as supporting evidence by other organizations and individuals.
The recent linkage of wildlife losses, poaching and global inse-
curity is revealing. What is significant is not necessarily whether
we can establish that poaching is funding instability and even glo-
bal terrorism, in line with the approach of environmental security
(Homer-Dixon, 1999; Berdal and Malone, 2000); the important
issue is that a wide range of organizations are all communicating
the same message in a very similar way, and that their arguments
are based on a very narrow evidence base. In making the link to
global security, the underlying reasons for the emergence and
activities of militia and rebel groups are left as a ‘black box’ and
are not discussed. Further, it deliberately taps into contemporary
anxieties about global security threats, the identification of legiti-
mate targets for military action, and the War on Terror. As
Cooley and Ron (2002) point out, during the 1990s NGOs in the
humanitarian relief sector were increasingly engaged in a compet-
itive market to secure funding and contracts with donors. This
dynamic was mirrored in the conservation sector as well, which
partly explains why conservation NGOs have been so keen to
promote the idea that poaching and trafficking constitute signifi-
cant national and international security threats. The assumption
is that by rendering poaching a security issue it will allow them
to tap into the greater resources available for security and
anti-terrorism initiatives (as compared with environmental/
biodiversity conservation).
4. The material war by conservation
The discursive production of poachers-as-terrorists and ivory as
the white gold of Jihad is not just semantics. There is a combined
effect of so many organizations promoting the same message,
based on a narrow evidence base of inter-linked expert testimonial,
the EAL investigation and a small number of high profile journalist
accounts. It has a material effect on the calls for renewed forceful
approaches to tackle poaching, underpinned by a shift in funding
that is being made available to support new initiatives around
use of COIN techniques, more commonly associated with War on
Terror, notably use of military force, greater surveillance, develop-
ment of intelligence networks and use of new technologies. This
allows conservation to move from fortress conservation to war
by conservation because it is increasingly integrated with the
agenda of the War on Terror. Below I set out examples to provide30 John Scanlon, expert witness testimonial to the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Hearing ‘Ivory and Insecurity: The Global Implications of Poaching in
Africa’ 22.05.12. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Scanlon_Testimony.
pdf (accessed 15.08.14).
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gies that combine to produce organization within national parks,
offensive positions which extend beyond protected areas, and
approaches that are spatially extensive and rely on the production
and cultivation of wide-ranging surveillance and intelligence
gathering networks.
First, it is clear that there has been a policy shift within some
national parks which has promoted increasing militarization of
conservation, which is spatially confined within the protected
areas boundaries (Duffy and Humphreys, 2014; Humphreys and
Smith, 2014). However, these shifts are interesting because they
are made possible by the ‘neoliberal’ phase or approach to conser-
vation (see Büscher et al., 2012; Massé and Lunstrum, 2015), since
they rely on and normalize the use of the private sector to provide
security within protected areas. A good example is the ways WWF
has turned to private military companies (PMCs) to deliver security
operations in protected areas that they manage on behalf of states.
WWF has contracted a private military company to deliver anti-
poaching. Israeli-based Maisha Consulting offers training for
poaching units in Garamba National Park, DRC and has provided
security advice and installed a network of remote surveillance
cameras in Dzangha-Sangha National Park in the Central African
Republic.31 The use of PMCs to deliver anti-poaching was used on
a small scale before the current rises in poaching, but it is an increas-
ingly common approach especially in areas where the State lacks
enforcement capacity. The discursive production of poachers as
criminals, militias and terrorists has made it possible to consider,
accept and implement new approaches that more closely reflect
the methods of the War on Terror and global intervention. This also
indicates that while this paper focuses on the Horn of Africa and the
War on Terror, some of the ways that security and conservation are
being integrated are mirrored elsewhere.
Militarization within national parks is also discernible in South
Africa’s current rhino wars. The appointment of Major General
Johan Jooste (retired) as coordinator of anti-poaching for Kruger
National Park in South Africa in 2012 is indicative of the increasing
militarization of anti-poaching efforts. Jooste has argued that SAN-
Parks staff face a rising level of armed incursions by poachers, and
that organized crime networks are involved, such that there is a
need for a more aggressive response from those mandated with
protecting rhinos. Jooste clearly identifies poaching as a declara-
tion of war, linking it to wider regional security issues, such as con-
trol of illegal migration routes through protected areas as well as
governance failures in neighboring states, especially Mozambique
(see Humphreys and Smith, 2014; Rademeyer, 2012; Lunstrum,
2014; Dunn, 2009).32 The case of South Africa also indicates how
policies that are initially designed for protected areas are quickly
and easily reconfigured for further extension outside those bound-
aries; for example, Massé and Lunstrum (2015) demonstrates how
land adjacent to Kruger and on the Mozambican side of the border
is being captured by private interests under the guise of providing
security for wildlife in Kruger National Park). Humphreys and
Smith (2014) point to a ‘rhinofication’ South African security, sug-
gesting that the intensification of the anti-poaching strategy of SAN-
Parks is part of a trend towards militarization which resembles
developments in late-modern warfare. These emphasize close tar-
geting of individuals or groups, under the banner of ‘man-hunting’
or ‘targeted killings’. South Africa’s management plan for black rhino
points to the critical importance of better intelligence systems to
prevent poaching, rather than relying on prosecutions after a rhino
has been killed (Knight et al., 2013: 38; Department of
Environmental Affairs, 2013: 20). South Africa now offers a cash31 http://maisha-consulting.com/environmental-security (accessed 15.08.14).
32 http://www.sanparks.org/about/news/default.php?id=55388 (accessed 03.09.13).
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8 R. Duffy / Geoforum xxx (2015) xxx–xxxreward of R100,000 for information which leads to arrest and
R1,000,000 for successful conviction of the heads of criminal poach-
ing gangs. The initiative links in with Crime Line and allows the
public to give anonymous information via SMS.33 Büscher and
Ramutsindela (forthcoming) argue that such approaches rely on
rebuilding the kinds of intelligence and surveillance networks that
characterized the Apartheid regime in South Africa.
South Africa has received perhaps the greatest level of attention
and particular projects have received large donations from philan-
thropists who are keen to support more forceful approaches to
conservation (for a broader discussion of philanthropy in conserva-
tion see Ramutsindela et al. (2011) and Holmes (2012)). One
example is the US$25 million donation by the Howard G. Buffett
Foundation to the Kruger National Park to set up an Intensive Pro-
tection Zone for rhinos inside the park during 2014–2017; another
is the R26.8 million (US$2.5 million) donation to Peace Parks Foun-
dation from the Dutch and Swedish Postcode Lotteries to work
with Ezemvelo KZN to conserve rhinos in protected areas. Rhinos
have been presented as national heritage that requires militarized
defence against organized crime networks that originate outside
the country. In line with arguments made by Peluso and
Vandergeest (2011) it can be argued that militarized approaches
to anti-poaching in South Africa have been used by the State to
gain greater control over territory in the border area with Mozam-
bique. Concerns about security and securing the border have been
key arguments in justifications for more forceful responses by state
agencies, notably by SANParks (Massé and Lunstrum, 2015;
Büscher and Ramutsindela, forthcoming).
National governments have also developed new initiatives to
respond to the increases in poaching that go beyond the confines
of protected areas. In February 2014 the US Government
announced its National Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking;
its three approaches are increased enforcement, demand reduction
and increased international cooperation and commitment (White
House, 2014). In June 2014 the UK Department of Environment,
Food, Rural Affairs and the Department for International Develop-
ment invited applications to a £10 million illegal wildlife trade
challenge fund which was available to help develop the Elephant
Protection Initiative support practical actions to combat poaching
and trafficking in line with the three pillars of the London Declara-
tion and hosting a follow up conference in Botswana in 2015.34 It
was not a requirement that projects be linked to protected areas
per se, they can extend out in spatial terms, but they could also be
engaged at the national and regional levels, since training of law
enforcement officials and support for design and enforcement of
new national level anti-poaching laws were also supported by the
fund.
Finally, war by conservation is characterized by techniques that
are more commonly associated with COIN and global security ini-
tiatives. Some indicative examples are useful here, many more
could be cited. Google provided US$5 million to WWF to purchase
and operate drones as part of its anti-poaching initiatives35; and US
$750,000 was provided to ZSL for installation of camera traps with
automated sensors in Kenya; the sensors transmit alerts of gunfire,
vehicle movement, and human presence. These two projects were
funded as part of Google’s Global Impact Awards, which aim to assist
in expansion of new technologies in key global challenges. The use of
drones is not necessarily indicative of a shift to war by conservation,
it is the context in which they are deployed which is important; for
example, drones have multiple purposes and have been promoted by33 http://www.sanparks.org/about/news/default.php?id=55388 (accessed 30.09.14).
34 DEFRA/DfID Call for funding applications, https://www.gov.uk/government/pub-
lications/the-illegal-wildlife-trade-challenge-fund (accessed 15.08.14).
35 http://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/google-helps-wwf-stop-wildlife-crime
(accessed 15.08.14).
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tions as a low cost option for data collection, including wildlife
movements in remote areas that cannot be covered by existing parks
staff (Marris, 2013). War by conservation is also discernible in mate-
rial ways in broader anti-poaching strategies in Kenya. For example,
Kenya Wildlife Service declared 2011 the ‘year of the rhino’ to direct
focus and resources; the rhino ranger force has been expanded by
more than 25% during 2011 via a process during which rhino scouts
on private lands were converted into Kenya Police Reservists; com-
munity scouts have also been offered formal training in wildlife pro-
tection, sniffer dogs have been used at international ports, tracker
dogs have been used for monitoring, and rhinos have been relocated
from areas of high risk to areas of low risk (KWS, 2012: 24).
Another clear example of the shift to war by conservation in
material ways was the launch of ‘Stabilization Through Conserva-
tion’ or StabilCon by the Tsavo Trust in December 2014. Tsavo
Trust argues that it is a recognition that the temptation to poach
can only be tackled via poverty reduction; it is firmly rooted within
a security approach to tackling environmental change, especially
illegal hunting of elephants. It aims to recruit and train anti-
poaching units drawn from the local community to enhance the
physical security of wildlife and communities in at-risk areas; its
proponents also state that intelligence gathering and development
of information networks are critical to the success of the initia-
tive.36 It has full support from the Governor of the Tana River County
and from the Kenyan Government. Ian Saunders, Chief Operations
Officer for Tsavo Trust, has been appointed as the security adviser
to the Governor of Tana River County; Saunders brings a specific
set of skills and expertise since he has a background in counter
insurgency operations in Afghanistan.37
The production of poachers-as-terrorists, and as legitimate tar-
gets for a war by conservation, has had significant material effects.
Conservation, global security and COIN are becoming increasingly
integrated, which signals a significant shift from earlier phases
characterized as fortress conservation or war for biodiversity. This
has resulted in the militarization of approaches within the bound-
aries of protected areas (see Duffy and Humphreys, 2014;
Humphreys and Smith, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Dunn, 2009); but
we can also detect a range of new offensives that extend well
beyond these boundaries and into the lands and communities that
surround them; these include the extension of state control over
territories and unruly populations (Peluso and Vandergeest,
2011). It is significant that local communities are also being drawn
in and reconfigured as a ‘first line of defence’ against poachers-as-
terrorists, rendering them military operatives engaged in advanc-
ing the agendas of external actors concerned about global security.
Further, war by conservation infuses national and global level
policies and debates, not just in the biodiversity conservation
sector but also in debates about how best to respond to global
security concerns. This is a significant shift from fortress conserva-
tion and war for biodiversity into a phase of warfare that is prose-
cuted by conservationists. Furthermore, these changes demand a
fresh examination of debates on the links between environment
and conflict provided by environmental security and political ecol-
ogy. Neither can fully explain the recent shift to war by conserva-
tion, and instead it is useful think through how conservation is
being more fully integrated with global security concerns, which
facilitates the use of a wider range of COIN techniques including23.03.15).
37 The links between conservation and stabilization were discussed at the StabilCon
launch event at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London on 1 December
2014; it was attended by Ian Saunders, Chief Operations Officer, Tsavo Trust, Professor
Judi Wakhungu, Secretary of State for the Environment, Water and Natural Resources,
Republic of Kenya; Ambassador Hussein Dado, Governor, Tana River County, Republic
of Kenya. The author was an invited member of the discussion panel.
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and greater use of pre-emptive and deadly force by national
armies, private military companies and state-based conservation
agencies.5. Conclusion
We are entering a new phase marked by a shift to war by con-
servation because conservation is becoming deeply implicated in
advancing a global security agenda, such that conservation agen-
cies themselves are engaged in prosecuting warfare against targets
defined as poacher-terrorists. This shift has been facilitated by a
rise in illegal hunting, especially of elephants and rhinos in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the development and deployment of new forms
of surveillance technology and the production of a discursive link
between poaching and terrorism. The remarkable similarity of
statements from NGOs, Governments and international organiza-
tions has provided the legitimating arguments for the claims, espe-
cially that ivory is used to fund Al Shabaab. Using debates on
environmental security, political ecology and interventionism,
allows for a better understanding of how the argument of
poacher-as-terrorist is being deployed and what implications it
holds for practice on the ground. The core themes that are more
usually associated with narratives around global security have
been effectively used and operationalized in relation to ‘defence/
protection’ of the non-human world. It has become more possible
to consider and authorize the use of force in defence of wildlife.
While conservation has a long history of using violent methods
(Neumann, 2004) including shoot-to-kill, the current phase differs
because conservation is becoming a core part of a global security
apparatus; therefore using force to protect elephants and rhinos
is increasingly presented and justified as a win–win of conserva-
tion and global security. The implications of this in terms of long
term conservation practice are potentially significant.
First the ways that conservation is integrating with security
concerns has the potential to place rangers in the front line, not
in a poaching war but in the War on Terror. This has implications
for current and future staff. For example, rangers did not necessar-
ily enter the profession with the goal of being active combatants in
a War on Terror. For some this will not be acceptable, and conser-
vation agencies are likely to lose valuable well trained staff at a
time when they can least afford to.
Second, it raises complex questions about the impact on com-
munities of shifting to conservation as a form of combat or military
style intervention that extends beyond the boundaries of protected
areas. Such as shift has the capacity to fundamentally change hard
won relationships with local communities, alienating them and
reducing their support for conservation in the longer term. Of
course there will inevitably be cases where local communities wel-
come greater levels of enforcement of parks because it provides
them with security from armed groups such as LRA, Janjaweed
and Al Shabaab.
Third, although the extension of war by conservation both in
terms of territory and strategy is currently confined to a fewAppendix A. Timeline
2007–8 Range of conservation NGOs and government agencies st
2010 ICCWC established
Please cite this article in press as: Duffy, R. War, by Conservation. Geoforum (countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (notably Kenya, South
Africa, Tanzania, Mali, Gabon and Central African Republic), it sets
a precedent. It is entirely possible that once key populations of
rhinos and elephants are either lost to poaching or are secured in
those locations, then organized poaching will turn to new sources
of supply (e.g. Namibia for rhinos and Botswana for elephants).
Equally, if new ‘frontlines’ open up in the War on Terror, then
the war by conservation is already operational and can be more
easily and quickly utilized and extended. There are already
examples from other regions, such as the use of drones and other
military tactics in Kaziranga National Park in India and use of
drones to monitor illegal fishing in the territorial waters of Belize,
also known as an important drug trafficking route in Central
America.
Fourth, such shifts have the capacity to undermine conservation
NGOs. There are significant reputational risks associated with
working closely with state-level security services. This is especially
important communities that regard the state as an oppressive force
rather than as a democratic representative and provider of security
and welfare. Conservation NGOs run the risk of simply being
regarded as facilitating and implementing the agenda of a hostile
actor (the state). Similar arguments can be made with regard to
whether conservation NGOs might be regarded as unwelcome
agents of powerful states engaged in the War on Terror. Forming
such alliances makes conservation a central part of a global politi-
cal project – moving it far from its core mission of trying to save
species from extinction.
Finally, in theoretical terms, the shift towards war by conserva-
tion presents us with a rich and fascinating field of conceptual
enquiry. The aim of this paper is to open up that debate and indi-
cate areas for future work. It is important to investigate whether
the (continuing) neoliberal phase of conservation laid the ground-
work to make war by conservation possible; for example, without
the neoliberal phase, would conservationists have accepted the
use of private military companies so readily if they had not already
developed such strong links with the private sector. There is
capacity for much greater theoretical development around the
limits of current environmental security and political ecology
approaches to understanding the links between resources and
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2012 Elephant Action League (EAL) place report on poaching their website
Johan Jooste appointed as coordinator of anti poaching in Kruger National Park, identifies poaching as a declaration of war
National Geographic and WWF convene a panel with the US Secretary of State on military support for anti poaching
ICCF convenes hearing on The Global Poaching Crisis, with expert testimonials
Google provides US$5 million to WWF and ZSL to develop the use of drones for conservation surveillance in northern Kenya
2013 Westgate Mall attack, Nairobi
Prince Charles convenes high level meeting to galvanize a UK response to poaching wars
President Obama issues Executive Order 13648 on Combatting Wildlife Trafficking
WCS launches 96 Elephants campaign
United for Wildlife formed
Clinton Global Initiative announce intention to raise US$80 million to combat poaching and trafficking
CITES Director John E Scanlon issues a series of statements about poaching and global security
UNEP report Elephants in the Dust
2014 South Africa releases figures showing a threshold of 1000 rhino killed in one year
Symposium on wildlife trafficking held at Zoological Society of London on behalf of UfW
London Conference on the illegal wildlife trade
London Declaration on the illegal wildlife trade arising from the London Conference
UK Government DEFRA/DfID Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge fund of £10 million launched to support the objectives of the
London Declaration
UfW launches #whosesideareyouon
US Government announces National Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking
USAID makes US$40 million available for projects tackling the illegal wildlife trade
US$25 million donation by Howard G. Buffett Foundation for anti poaching in Kruger National Park
2015 Second International Conference on the Illegal Wildlife Trade held in Kasane, Botswana March 2015 – Kasane Statement
issued
Government DEFRA/DfID commits a further £5 million for the Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund
RUSI report launched questioning the link between ivory and Al-Shabaab
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